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Abstract 
Quotation and reflective interpretation of previous statements are common features in police 
interviews. Of particular importance is the uncovering of apparent contradictions between earlier 
and current responses in interviews of suspects. Conflicting statements can be used by officers as 
triggers to elicit new responses that explain inconsistencies. In linguistic pragmatics, such 
reflective commenting on utterances is categorized as metacommunication, i.e. ‘communication 
about communication’, which includes metarepresentation, i.e. second-order representation of 
another representation through some form of quotation. Such instances of metacommunication 
are key-instances of negotiating the communicative interests of its chief participants, which in a 
suspect interviews consist on the one hand in the interviewers’ purpose of establishing grounds 
for a potential criminal charge and, on the other hand, the interviewee’s interest in avoiding such 
a charge. This article analyses exemplary cases of metacommunication in multilingual police 
interviews from the perspective of quotation pragmatics. The results suggest that police interview 
training should pay special attention to this area in order to optimise cognitive results. 
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1. Introduction: Metacommunication and Metarepresentation in Interviews of 
Suspects 
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Quoting of and commenting on suspects’ statements are common features in police interviews 
that serve to highlight discrepancies between current and earlier statements made by the suspect 
or other speakers (e.g. witnesses, victims) or between them and forensic evidence. In some cases, 
suspects’ responses to such contradictions may resolve the apparent conflict and possibly absolve 
them from suspicion and further investigation, but often they incriminate them further and lead to 
confessions and prosecution. Legal and forensic researchers have therefore studied the use of 
quotations and other forms of reported speech, including controversial “echo questions”, in 
police interviews (Gibbons 2003: 111-112; Newbury and Johnson 2006; Oxburgh, Myklebust 
and Grant 2010: 53, 57) as well as their function in the wider forensic-judicial process, e.g. in 
trials (Cotterill 2004, Coulthard 2004; Matoesian 2000; Johnson 2008, 2013, 2014). 
While considerable attention has thus been paid to the use of quotations from a legal viewpoint, 
detailed linguistic analyses appear to be thin on the ground, despite the fact that the relevance of 
linguistic pragmatic research for forensics has been recognised in principle (Poggi and Capone 
2016, 2017). This may have to do with the fact that quotation theory was for a long time 
dominated by logico-semantic approaches and has only relatively recently become the object of 
pragmatics, and more specifically, “metapragmatics”, i.e. the analysis of meta-communication 
(Arendholtz, Bublitz and Kirner-Ludwig 2015; Brendel, Steinbach and Meibauer 2011, Hübler 
and Bublitz 2007). Within the metapragmatic framework, quotations can be viewed as special 
cases of “metarepresentation”, insofar as they constitute “utterances about attributed utterances” 
(Wilson 2000: 413): they metarepresent the quoted utterance, as part of another representation, 
i.e. the speaker’s current utterance.  
This multiple “meta”-terminological classification of quotation is indicative of a paradigm shift 
in its linguistic treatment: instead of highlighting its derived nature as derivative upon the 
original utterance, its function as a move that interrupts the current ‘online’ communication and 
opens up a new level of social interaction/ communication comes to the fore. Following Bublitz 
(2015: 4), we can characterise this move as an act of recontextualisation of an existing utterance 
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(U1) that draws the recipient’s attention to its new version (U2) and the relationship between 
both. Such a ‘quotation move’ involves a disruption of the first-order ongoing discourse, which 
may go unnoticed by the communicants due to its embeddedness in the main ongoing interaction 
but still requires an analytically distinct level of pragmatic description and explanation. The 
present study discusses this second-order dimension of quotations with specific regard to police 
interviews on the basis of anonymised transcripts of suspect interviews by the Norfolk 
Constabulary that were made available as part of the TACIT (Translation and Communication in 
Training) project at the University of East Anglia.1 The data are drawn from interviews of 
suspects with other languages than English as L1 and involved interpreters, which of course 
raises issues of interpreting and translation (Filipović and Hijazo-Gascón this volume). These 
aspects do not, however, feature here; instead we will focus on an exploratory investigation of 
how applying the concepts of metacommunication and metarepresentation to quotations in police 
interviews help to refine interviewing techniques in the context of interview outcomes (Walsh 
and Bull 2015): How can the metapragmatic analysis of quotations help interviewers solve 
interaction problems and optimise cognitive outcomes? 
 
 
2. The importance of being quoted: cautions, quotations and metacommunicative 
argument loops 
Every police interview of a suspect is characterised by a heightened degree of awareness and 
attention to quotations, due to the obligatory, routine caution about the legal consequences of any 
statements made by the suspect: “You do not have to say anything but it may harm your defence 
if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything 
you do say may be given in evidence” (College of Policing 2017; Gov.uk 2017a, b). Used at the 
                                                 
1 See TACIT 2018. For further details of the research project see the introduction to this volume. 
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start of an interview, it puts all parties that are present, i.e. the suspect, their legal representative, 
interpreter and the interviewing officer(s), on an alert for the legal and potentially life-changing 
consequences of the suspect’s statements. In particular, the conditional construction, “it may 
harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in 
court”, contains an explicit warning (which may also be perceived as a threat) that non-
cooperation in the interview could have negative repercussions in the later court procedures. 
Effectively, it announces to suspects that their being unresponsive in the interview may be seen 
as suspicious during the trial.2  
Moreover, the announcement that any statement made as part of an interview “may be given in 
evidence” in court highlights the fact that it is likely to resurface as a quoted text. The 
correctness of quotation as part of the interview record is thus an essential requirement of the 
interviewing process and the necessity to produce dependable quotations is a prime concern for 
all parties. The interviewees and their lawyers rely on quoted statements being consistent, 
credible and, ideally, exonerating them from guilt if it comes to a trial; the police depend on them 
a) to justify their own prosecuting and interviewing actions against the suspect and b) to support 
the further prosecution in court. All statements in an investigative interview are therefore 
characterised by the prospect of being quoted with significant legal and personal consequences 
for the speaker. 
Such a heightened awareness about the importance of quotable details for the whole process of 
interviewing, charging and trying someone for a criminal offence is well illustrated in our first 
example from the TACIT corpus (see below). The suspect is a Lithuanian national who had been 
arrested on a previous day at a Norwich Supermarket for possession of forged credit cards and 
had since been charged and appeared in court on for alleged credit card fraud. To establish more 
                                                 
2 Research has shown that the police caution’s explicit permission of silence during an interview is often viewed by 
courts as an “adoptive admission” (of guilt), i.e. it can in fact be to the disadvantage of the suspect; see e.g. Cotterill 
2005: 10-21; Ainsworth 2012: 297-298; Rock 2012: 322-323. 
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details about how and when he met his suspected accomplices, the interviewers start asking him 
to provide information about his car journey from London to Norwich prior to meeting them. At 
first, the interviewee claims to have bought and insured the car in London: “I came in my own 
car”, “I bought it in London”, “I had insurance from the owner, in the name of the owner of the 
garage, and I had several days to change that and to obtain my own insurance”. 
However, when asked about details of the purchase and documents to prove them, he claims he 
cannot remember exactly where the garage was, who the previous owner was or how exactly the 
car was insured. When confronted with the information (retrieved from Police checks on the 
impounded car) that he is currently neither the registered owner nor the insurance policy holder 
of the car in question, he starts shifting his own account and claims never to have looked closely 
at the insurance documents and to have purchased them via the internet, whilst at the same time 
not remembering his own Hotmail web address. At this point the police and the suspect’s 
solicitor who is present at the interview decide that the suspect needs further legal advice and 
interrupt the interview briefly. After a pause of 2 minutes, the lead interviewer recapitulates the 
state of play, starting off with an ironical introduction intimating a disinterested “discussion” but 
then quickly coming to the crux of the matter: “We were discussing the merits of insuring a 
motor vehicle in England, in Britain. Just ‘cos you’re from a different country, being ignorant to 
the fact that we do things maybe different over here, isn’t an excuse. I will be making enquiries 
with the actual registered owner of that vehicle, I will be making enquiries with your Hotmail 
account, to see if at any time you have bought an insurance policy on there, and I will be 
searching that vehicle for the documentation in the glove box. Is there anything you want to say 
about that vehicle being yours or the way you’ve insured it?”  
The interviewee is thus given one more chance to clarify the circumstances of the car purchase, 
in the knowledge that the police can and will check his statements against records and witnesses 
that are already or will soon be at their disposal. Over the following five minutes the following 
dialogue ensues: 
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Example 1:3 
(1) Int[erpreter’s version of suspect’s statement]: As I mentioned, the car was supposed to be 
mine, and the car was supposed to be insured for a certain amount of time. But 
personally I never took an insurance out. Unless I can see the situation as such that he 
didn’t write out the documents for me, or didn’t send the documents out when I 
bought the car. 
(2) D[etective] C[onstable] 1: So you’re now saying that you haven’t taken out insurance on 
this vehicle? 
(3) Int: Personally I never insured the vehicle. 
(4) DC1: How do you know the vehicle is insured for you? 
(5) Int: I was told so. 
(6) DC1: By whom? 
(7) Int: When I was buying the car, that person told me so. The garage has got some sort of 
insurance that gives the person that buys the vehicle a chance to sort the insurance 
out. 
(8) DC1: They’re very strange, unbelievable answers you’re giving me. 
(9) Int: The last answers that I have given you are truthful. 
(10) DC1:  So what before you weren’t being truthful? 
(11) Int: What do you mean? 
(12) DC1: Well if the answers you’ve just given me are truthful … 
(13) Int: It was the same, but we just misunderstood each other, we weren’t able to put the 
pieces together. 
(14) DC1: That’s rubbish, I was very clear in my questioning and with your 
understanding. It’s only when your solicitor asked to have a further consultation with 
you, that you have now decided to say a different tack, shall we say. That’s my 
opinion and we’re gonna move on. 
 
At the start of this passage, when the interview resumes after the suspect’s legal consultation 
with his solicitor, he has realised that the car purchase in London, which previously may have 
  7 
seemed to be a trivial prelude to the main charge (credit card fraud in Norwich), has become a 
suspicious matter in its own right in the eyes of the investigating officers. The suspect’s hedged 
(translated) formulations in turn 1, e.g. “the car was supposed to be mine, and the car was 
supposed to be insured”, indicate that he is aware that due to his failure to prove insurance and 
ownership, his previous claims seem implausible and might incriminate him further. He now 
tries to explain the fact that he has not got any insurance documents for the car with an alleged 
mishandling of the insurance documents by the London garage (turns 3, 5, 7). 
However, even this re-explanation contradicts the information previously given. What follows is 
a metacommunicative struggle about the interpretation of this discrepancy. The police officer 
first only highlights the implausibility of the interviewee’s latest answer, i.e. that he naively 
relied on information by the car seller (turn 8: “They’re very strange, unbelievable answers….”), 
but then pounces on its contrast with the interviewee’s previous assertions by asking suggestively 
in turn 10: “So what before you weren’t being truthful?” and in turn 12: “Well if the answers 
you’ve just given me are truthful …”.4 
Having been put on the spot, the suspect tries to maintain that he is being consistent and that the 
discrepancy is a mere “misunderstanding” but the interviewing officer bluntly states that he has 
made up his mind; he concludes (turn 14) that the suspect’s interpretation of the inconsistency as 
a misunderstanding was “rubbish” and that he has only changed his “tack” after having been 
made aware of the legal consequences of his previous statements. The investigating officer thus 
uses his position of legal and socio-communicative power (Gibbons 2003: 74-76, 95-108) to 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Here and in the following examples only the numbering of “conversational turns” (Coulthard 1977: 52-62) has 
been added; everything else is as in the original TACIT transcripts. 
4 The omission of punctuation and syntactic ellipsis (e.g. omission of the rest of the prepositional construction that 
starts with “before”) in the transcript makes a detailed discourse analysis even of the translated text difficult. In the 
context, “so” and “well” seem function as discourse markers (Schiffrin 2001); with the former indicating a suggested 
(negative!) inference that is put to the interviewee, and the latter signalling a doubting stance by the interviewer, 
followed by an elliptical conditional that the interviewee is again invited to agree with. In both cases the 
conversational implicature (Grice 1989) intended by the investigating officer is that the interviewee’s truth-claim in 
turn 9, “The last answers that I have given you are truthful”, has falsified his previous statements. 
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close down the discussion about the car’s insurance status and establish his own version as the 
dominant one: “That’s my opinion and we’re gonna move on”. 
The investigator’s abrupt order to “move on” is partly explainable by time pressure: he aims to 
get as quickly as possible to the details of main criminal issue on his interview agenda, i.e. the 
suspect’s alleged credit card fraud in Norwich as part of an organised gang. But by the time the 
officer concludes the insurance discussion, 31.05 minutes of the interview had already been spent 
and, the suspect hasn’t even left London in his narrative!  Given that there is a pressure on the 
interviewers to cover as much of the criminally relevant content matter in a limited space of time, 
it could be seen as astonishing that they allow so much time for the debate about the car purchase 
details. However, in a sense they have no choice: once the discrepancy between the suspect’s 
previous claim of his own car ownership and the later statement become evident, both sides have 
to declare which version they want to maintain for the record. This requires them to leave the 
ongoing narrative and enter a metacommunicative negotiation about truthfulness.  
During this negotiation the suspect attempts to play down the discrepancy in order to maintain a 
semblance of credibility, whereas the officer highlights it, explores it and disqualifies it as a self-
contradiction by the interviewee. The final disqualification makes it explicit that the police 
interviewer sees the suspect as a highly suspect and unreliable participant in the interview who is 
cunning enough to change his storyline (“tack”) whenever he becomes aware of legal pitfalls. By 
engaging in such metacommunicative evaluation the interviewer goes beyond just eliciting the 
interviewee’s version of events and instead gives an indication of his own views on the subject 
matter, his negative attitude towards the interviewee and his power to steer the interview at a 
pace that he determines. However, it seems questionable whether this explicit evaluation and 
power-assertion is helpful in taking the interview forward in terms of an optimal cognitive, 
informative outcome. It succeeds in “moving on” the interview and clearly establishes the 
conversational ‘frontlines’, so to speak, but in doing so also impacts on the interactional and 
interpersonal levels by imposing on the interview a distinctly adversarial, even confrontational 
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character. In terms of other pragmatic dimensions explored in this volume, such as rapport and 
face (see Pounds and de Pablos-Ortega, this volume), the officer’s explicit disqualification of the 
suspect’s answer largely undermines the possibility of cooperative communication between the 
investigators, indicating that the suspect’s “different tack” answers are not likely to be believed.  
Following on from the discussion about the car insurance, the interview participants quickly hit a 
new stumbling point, despite the officer’s impatience and the suspect’s seeming compliance in 
wrapping up his account: “We [i.e., he and another Lithuanian man] met in London, I was 
offered to make some money by getting some gift cards and then just food. After we met 2 days 
later, we got into a car, came here to this so-called Norwich, I was given that card, I went to the 
shop and that’s it. We’re now at the end” (time: 37.36 minutes of the interview).  
This quickly told story is evidently too sketchy to satisfy the interviewers and the suspect can 
hardly have expected to reach “the end” of it that quickly. In fact, almost half hour is spent on 
when exactly he met his accomplice in Stratford on the way from London to Norwich. At first he 
answers the respective question with the vague statement “Midday-ish”. About five minutes 
later, after a “recap” by the police interviewer, he changes the timing: “Maybe not midday, but 
around that time. I can’t say the exact time when we got into Norfolk.” This is the moment when 
a further metacommunicative exchange brings proceedings again to a halt. Instead of simply 
noting the changed information, the interviewer first ‘corrects’ the suspect’s statement and then 
presses him on the precise time: 
 
Example 2: 
(1) DC1:  I’m not asking you what time you got into Norfolk. I’m asking what time 
you picked him up. 
(2) Int.: Roughly 10. 
(3) DC1:  10 o’clock now, so why did you…. 
(4) Int. Maybe I exaggerated with the midday, but it was around 10. 
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(5) DC1: It’s not about exaggerating, it’s about answering a simple question, 
something you have a great trouble in doing at the moment. 
(6) Int: What do you mean I struggle to answer simple questions? 
(7) DC2: It would be easier if you told us the truth right from the start, rather than 
us going round to find it out, always changing. 
(8) Int: God I don’t know, I’m not going in circles, every time you try tell the truth 
no-one believes you, people just believe lies. 
(9) DC2: You keep telling us different things, what do we believe? 
(10) Int: What do you mean by different things? 
(11) DC2: You told us midday, then it’s 10 o’clock, tell us … 
(12) Int: I just said word midday without thinking, 10, 11, I mean midday by just 
then. 
(13) DC2: So what time did you leave? 
(14) Int: 10 o’clock, let’s say 10 o’clock. 
(15) DC1: No, let’s not just say 10 o’clock, let’s ask what time you left. 
(16) Int: 10 o’clock. 
 
The discussion about the Stratford leaving time that moves from “midday-ish” to “10 o’clock” 
takes ten minutes, during which one interviewer (DC1) engages in sarcastic comments (“it’s 
about answering a simple question, something you have a great trouble in doing at the moment”) 
and mimicking the interviewees formulations (“let’s not just say 10 o’clock…”). Given that the 
interviewee has voluntarily offered a correction of his previous statement (“Maybe not midday, 
but around that time”) after the “recap”, it seems an exaggeration to accuse him of “always 
changing” his information when “found out”. This condemnation confirms the interviewer’s 
earlier interpretative stance of “rubbishing” the suspect’s statements but in fact does not match 
the suspect’s actual communicative behaviour on this occasion. The implausibility of his first 
time reference is easy to spot: if he was arrested in Norwich in mid-afternoon on the day of the 
car journey after some criminal activity having already taken place, it stands to reason that he left 
earlier than midday from Stratford. Crucially, however, it is the suspect himself who realises this 
mistake during the recap and openly provides more correct information and an apologetic 
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explanation (turn 4). For his efforts, he is rebuked and his self-correction is construed by the 
second interviewer as yet another discrepancy that exemplifies his unreliability (turns 7 and 9: “It 
would be easier if you told us the truth right from the start…”, “You keep telling us different 
things …”). 
In the remainder of the interview it becomes evident that the suspect’s vagueness about timings 
is at least partly due to the fact that he did not have a watch on him. In addition, the investigating 
officers gradually disclose that they have a reliable record of the car’s journey and stops between 
London and Norwich from the car’s Sat Nav and from CCTV footage that shows the interviewee 
and his accomplice at a petrol station, a lay-by and in and around the respective Norwich 
supermarket. Arguably, therefore, eliciting precise confirmation of timings for every stop on the 
journey from the suspect, although of course important in principle, was neither a top priority for 
securing evidence nor practically feasible. Thus, DC1’s exasperated challenge in turn 15, “No, 
let’s not just say 10 o’clock, let’s ask what time you left”, produces no extra or more precise 
information, but instead a repetition of the pertinently imprecise “10 o’clock” indication (turn 
16). With time pressure mounting, the interviewers then have no choice but to accept this and to 
press on, for another 40 minutes, during which their interviewee complains several times that he 
is “struggling to put the exact time to places and things that I have done, because you’re 
pressuring me on telling you the exact times and I really don’t know any exact times”, which 
DC1 finally concedes: “We’re not asking exact times, […]”.  
When trying, in a further interview on the following day, to resume reconstructing the suspect’s 
narrative from the point when he “went to the toilet at a lay-by” before entering Norwich, i.e. for 
the crucial time when he presumably started to commit offences, the investigators run into a wall 
of 131 unchanging “no comment” responses to their questions, which last for 50 minutes, 
according to the respective transcript. The recorded questions show that this part of the interview 
was meant to elicit substantial information not just about the suspect’s and his accomplice’s 
criminal exploits in Norwich supermarkets but also about the coordinated activities of a gang of 
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credit card-thieves and fraudsters operating across East Anglia and reaching into the Midlands. 
The officers suggest that the suspect may have been or is still “under duress” from or “afraid of” 
a suspected gang-leader in London but they elicit no information. Any rapport that may have 
existed between them and the suspect aft the start of the interview has evidently broken down. 
Of course, the suspect’s barrage of “no comment” comments in the second interview leaves only 
room for speculation in the analysis but it stands in stark contrast to his outwardly deferential, 
apologetic and partly cooperative behaviour in the preceding interview, from which examples 1 
and 2 were taken. Whilst in that interview the officers, legal counsellor and the suspect plus the 
interpreter spent an exhausting 95 minutes establishing that the interviewee’s memory of some 
details (car insurance documents, travel time between Stratford-Norwich) was unreliable, they 
appear to be failing in the subsequent interview to establish any substantial evidence concerning 
the large-scale criminal activity that he seemed to be involved in. 
This conclusion is not meant to criticise the interviewers’ focus on exact information-building 
but it shows the dangers of the interview interaction getting caught up in a metacommunicative 
‘loop’ of interviewers and interviewees arguing about discrepancies in the latter’s statements. 
While metacommunication is pervasive in naturally occurring dialogic communication, including 
police interviews, engaging in a protracted a loop can quickly lead to a dispute about differences 
in the other side’s interpretations at the expense of gathering reliable evidence. The 
metacommunicative loop evidenced in examples 1 and 2 has four stages:  
i) a ‘preceding’ statement by the interviewee,  
ii) the realisation (by one or several of the interview parties) that it conflicts with a ‘current’ 
statement,  
iii) the interviewers’ highlighting of this discrepancy on the basis of metarepresentations (e.g. 
quotations or indirect renderings of the suspects’ reported speech), and  
iv) their explicit evaluation of the discrepancy as evidence of deceitful moves on the part of 
the interviewee.  
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Depending on the suspect’s general attitude towards the officers’ questioning strategy, he may 
show compliant or resistant behaviour subsequent to stage iv, but this is a variable of their social 
power relationship, i.e. not a reliable indicator of truthfulness or evidential reliability. Crucially, 
without element (iv), the metacommunicative loop need not deteriorate into a dispute. If a 
discrepancy between different statements is simply noted or, even if highlighted, is treated at face 
value as an ‘innocent’ mistake (attributable to vagueness, failing memory, confusion …), the 
interviewers can give the suspect a chance to provide further information without significant loss 
of face in the interview situation. The avoidance of such face loss is crucial for maintain the 
rapport (Walsh and Bull 2012, and Pounds in this volume). The forensic and legal evaluation of 
the mismatch between individual responses can be left for a later stage of the investigation and, 
possibly, for further probing and prosecution in the trial.  
 
 
3. The importance of being earnestly allowed to reinterpret one’s own quotes 
Our next example is an illustration of avoiding a deteriorating metacommunicative loop. Again, 
we have a highly cautious suspect, who in two initial interviews uses the excuse of supposedly 
vague and non-existent memory (due to alcohol consumption) and “no comment” answers, to 
defend himself against a charge of having committed robbery and rape. After heavy drinking in a 
Norwich nightclub, he claims to have been driven home in a friend’s car and to have barely 
noticed that they were joined by a prostitute, i.e. the victim of the alleged crimes. Already in the 
first interviews he is confronted with victim and witness statements that implicate him in the 
collective rape of the prostitute and the theft of her money and jewellery. At the start of the third 
interview (on the day after the two initial ones) he is again confronted with the stark discrepancy 
of these testimonies with his own claim “that [..] he had been out with friends […] and they had 
gone to a nightclub, got into a car and gone straight home”. According to the interview transcript, 
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“when asked if this was correct, the suspect stated that it was half of the truth but confirmed this 
was what he said in the previous interview”.  
At this point, the interview has reached stage iii) of the metacommunicative negotiation where 
the investigating officers have to choose between dwelling on the apparent discrepancy or 
pursuing the unknown “half” of the truth. The following dialogue ensues:  
 
Example 3: 
(1) DC1: Is [sic] that account still stand? 
(2) Int.: Yes but on the way we picked up that prostitute but they don’t know 
whereabouts and when, I was so drunk, laying on the back seat in the car, I don’t 
know anything. She did that, we paid money and that’s all. 
(3) DC1: She did that, we paid money, then what happened? 
(4) Int.: And that’s all.  
(5) DC1: How did she leave?  
(6) Int.: Where?  
(7) DC1: When did you last see her?  
(8) Int.: On that night.  
 
As the suspect’s last answers (turns 4, 6, 8) demonstrate, he tries to stall the interrogation by ‘not 
remembering’ any details of the events beyond “picking up a prostitute” and getting a “blow-job” 
from her. However, instead of dwelling on his lack of cooperation or on the contrast between his 
new answer and his statements on the previous day, the interviewers take him back to the events 
even before the meeting with the prostitute, i.e. the drinking bout at the nightclub. They question 
him on every detail, e.g. about how much he had to drink, of what beverage, who he met with, 
how long they were at the club etc. Time references are of course just as important for them as 
for their colleagues in the credit cards fraud case but when they encounter resistance they offer 
the interviewee a chance to correct himself instead of ‘closing him down’:  
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Example 4: 
(1) DC1: In your first interview you said you thought it was 4 am that you left the 
nightclub. Is that right?  
(2) Int.: Can be, I don’t know.  
(3) DC1: Roughly that time?  
(4) Int.: Three or four.  
 
Gradually, over 92 minutes, they manage to bring him to ‘vaguely’ corroborate all the alleged 
events of the evening up to and including an alleged offer of intercourse by the prostitute and to 
explicitly deny rape and robbery. Most of the interviewee’s answers are heavily hedged (repeated 
use of subjunctives (could be, that would be possible), of adverbs like probably, maybe, which 
put epistemic certainty in question, of assertions that “he did not know” or “could not remember” 
details) and of attempts at feigning non-comprehension of English language questions.5 These 
attempts at obstruction are both highly transparent and implausible, as one interviewer observes: 
“You’re actually answering some of our questions before the interpreter is putting them to you 
through”.  Despite his obstructionism, however, the suspect is given space to tell the whole story 
as he wishes to present it, whilst in fact severely damaging his own credibility through a series of 
piecemeal admissions, some of which contradict what he had said only a few moments earlier. In 
parts of the interview, the apparently lenient interviewing strategy leads to bizarre 
inconsistencies. In one exchange the interviewing officer even apologizes, “That’s fine, I’ve 
misunderstood that, I’m sorry”, pretending as he does to have confused the alleged rape (which 
the suspect denies) with the “blow-job” (which he has admitted to and located at a particular time 
and place before the offered intercourse/rape episode). The officer gives the suspect a chance to 
                                                 
5 For the multiple challenges resulting from such uncooperativeness see Filipović’s analysis of a further part of this 
interview (example 7 in Filipović 2018b, this volume). 
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once more play innocent by supposedly having asked the prostitute on that occasion, “What are 
you doing?” and then to have “moved away” from her. However, through this assertion the 
suspect has trapped himself, as the officer can confront him with evidence of “condom found 
with your semen and cells from the victim” as well as “the victim’s handbag and her driving 
licence”, all of which were found at a different location on the road. At that point it becomes 
obvious that the rape and theft must have occurred at a different location and at a later time than 
the “blow-job” stop, which exposes the suspect’s claim to have not been involved at all after the 
“blow-job” as a lie. In the absence of any data on his further prosecution and the trial verdict, the 
impact of this interview cannot be fully determined but we can conclude that its outcome was 
highly revelatory in respect of the overall assessment of the suspect’s low credibility. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The above analyses have only exploratory character but show the urgent need to investigate 
systematically the role of quotations in police interviews, especially those of suspects, due to the 
crucial role they play in establishing the reliability of statements. Whenever a current statement 
appears to be inconsistent with a preceding one, the latter has to be quoted or alluded to and 
negotiated between interviewee and interviewers with a view to establishing their inherent truth-
claims. Such metacommunicative discussions can occur in all phases of the Cognitive 
(“PEACE”) Interview process that have been identified in research and ensuing guidelines 
(Dando, Wilcock and Milne 2009, Walsh and Bull 2015) but they matter most clearly for its 
Evaluation aspect and the overall assessment of a suspect as a “truth teller or liar” (Vredeveldt et 
al. 2014). However, the metacommunicative discussion also has the potential to disrupt and even 
stop an interview’s progress and diminish its cognitive results. This is the case when it 
deteriorates into an argument about apportioning blame for inconsistencies. In highlighting any 
inconsistency, interviewers put pressure on the interviewee to explain the discrepancy and 
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threaten his face wants. They threaten both his “involvement” face as someone who is entitled to 
maintain his innocence as well as his “independence” face as a conversation/interaction partner 
who is free to say what he likes.6 Being under caution, the suspect is compelled to defend both 
face aspects at the same time, i.e. produce an explanation that resolves the inconsistency and also 
lifts the implicit suspicion that he has been untruthful.  
Such massive “face-threatening acts” (FTAs) normally requires a high degree of “minimization” 
(Brown and Levinson 1978: 65-71, 95), but are unavoidable and require constant mitigation in 
investigative interviews. This conclusion ties in with Pablos-Ortega’s findings (this volume) that 
the great majority of “supportive moves” in police questionings are “mitigators” (72%) and that 
face-threatening “aggravation” accounts for less than a third (28%), with explicit disagreements 
and threats together making up less than a quarter (23%) of the latter, thus constituting a small 
sub-group. Their rare occurrence is explained by the fact that they tend to exacerbate the face-
threat for the interviewee and the suspicion of dishonesty against him, which are already inherent 
in the interview situation itself. If, in addition, the suspect is aggressively challenged regarding 
an inconsistency between his statements, he has almost no other choice than to go for all or 
nothing, so to speak, i.e. either confess – or defend all his previous responses as being truthful so 
that at least his “independence face” is maintained. The easiest way of achieving complete 
consistency may then be just to revert to the “no comment” strategy, which is of course the least 
satisfactory outcome from the interviewers’ perspective. Even if the interviewee does not become 
wholly uncooperative, a confrontational metacommunicative loop distracts him and the 
interviewers from building up a coherent narrative account including the factual evidence that he 
is supposed to provide. It may also inadvertently give him an impression that whatever he says is 
                                                 
6 For the classification of involvement/independence face see Scollon, Scollon and Jones (2012: 48-51), which builds 
on the earlier distinction of positive/negative face by Brown and Levinson (1978: 62-64).  
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deemed untrue, or as the suspect in example (2) puts it: “every time you try tell the truth no-one 
believes you”. 
In practical terms, it seems that a precondition to avoid this danger is the interviewers’ awareness 
of the metacommunicative function of interventions that challenge an interviewee’s statements 
on account of a discrepancy with preceding statements. Of course, the interviewers cannot simply 
accept the interviewee’s statements at face value, i.e. pretend that they were consistent when they 
are not; if a discrepancy becomes evident, they have no choice but to ask for an explanation. This 
should happen in any case in a non-threatening way but the interviewers must be prepared to be 
confronted by an ‘explanation’ that again is implausible or vague and nevertheless to refrain 
from evaluating this immediately as a sign of deliberate non-cooperation by the interviewee.  
It is here where the interviewing styles in our examples differ most: in the first two excerpts, the 
officers are evidently not satisfied with the explanations given by the suspect (‘confusion about 
car insurance’, ‘misjudged timing’) and convey their mistrust towards him openly. They thus not 
only endanger their rapport with him on an interactional basis but also give him no incentive to 
cooperate further by confirming his conviction that whatever he says will be disbelieved. In the 
third and fourth excerpts, on the other hand, the interviewers use the suspect’s own attempts to 
make a minimal adjustment when caught in a discrepancy as a platform for uncovering further 
factual details. They can thus escape a metacommunicative loop and resume evidence-building, 
and they repeat this move every time the suspect tries to stall. In this way, they manage to lead 
him into confirming most of his supposedly non-remembered story, so that he corroborates other 
witnesses’ and further forensic evidence, which is gradually disclosed to him. By leaving him to 
‘own’ his changing story throughout the interview, the interviewers gather a maximum of factual 
evidence, which can later be used for prosecution. At the social-interactional level the suspect is 
not challenged in his ‘right’ to refuse confessing, to claim a blurred memory and to make vague, 
imprecise and uncertain statements, i.e. to maintain his both involvement and independence face. 
However, at the cognitive-informative level he still provides the evidence that the interviewers 
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wish to elicit. Such an outcome seems to be preferable to the attempt to enforce a clear-cut and 
comprehensive explanation of each informative discrepancy, which can lead to a ‘stonewalling’ 
strategy that is consistent at the expense of being uninformative. 
These explorative findings suggest that an awareness of the dangers of a metacommunicative 
loop, and thus of the role of highlighting and arguing about contradictory quotations during a 
suspect interview,  could be of benefit to police officers who are facing the task of eliciting 
evidence from interviewees who even when they are principally compliant are likely to be 
stressed, sensitive to the danger of inadvertently incriminating themselves and trying to maintain 
their social face in a challenging environment. This awareness can help interviewers to gain a 
distance from the interactional-emotional level of struggling with a ‘difficult’ interviewee and 
instead to monitor and assess any cognitive inconsistencies so that they can be integrated into the 
Evaluation stage of the cognitive interview. Specifically, they may help fine-tuning interviewing 
skills to handle both first- and second-order levels of communication with an interviewee and to 
avoid clashes that end in ‘argument loops’ which provide no new information and can lead to an 
interviewee ‘clamming up’. 
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